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(''Brenner v. Manson'' ), , was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a novel process for making a known steroid did not satisfy the utility requirement because the patent applicants did not show that the steroid served any practical function. The Court ruled that "a process patent in the chemical field, which has not been developed and pointed to the degree of specific utility, creates a monopoly of knowledge which should be granted only if clearly commanded by the statute."〔Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).〕 Practical or specific utility is the requirement for an invention to have a particular purpose.〔 The case is known for the statement "a patent is not a hunting license."〔383 U.S. at 536. What Justice Fortas meant by this quip was that patents should not be granted so that the patentee could look for (hunt) a utility ''after'' gaining possession of a patent monopoly.〕 ==Appellate jurisdiction issue== The ''Manson'' case is the first in which the Court granted a writ of ''certiorari'' in an appeal of a patent office rejection of a patent application. For many years there had been uncertainty whether the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) was an Article III court, and thus one as to which the Supreme Court had ''certiorari'' jurisdiction.〔In ''Ex parte Bakelite Corp.'', 279 U.S. 438 (1929), and ''Williams v. United States'', 289 U.S. 553 (1933), the Court had held that the CCPA and Court of Claims were Article I courts. See also ''Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co.'',272 U. S. 693 (1927). However, subsequent legislation made the matter unclear.〕 For many years, almost until the eve of the ''Manson'' case, the Solicitor General had opposed petitions for ''certiorari'' by disappointed patent applicants on the basis that the CCPA was an Article I court to which the Supreme Court's ''certiorari'' jurisdiction did not extend. In ''Lurk v. United States'',〔370 U.S. 530 (1962).〕 however, the Court held that judges of the CCPA (as well as those of the Court of Claims) were Article III judges.〔However, the ''Lurk'' decision expressly left open the question whether 28 U.S.C. § 1256 conferred ''certiorari'' jurisdiction over patent and trademark cases decided in the CCPA, 370 U.S. at 578 n. 49. It suggested, however, that the prior law to the contrary was a museum piece.〕 In the ''Manson'' case the Court expressly held that ''certiorari'' was available to review CCPA decisions.〔383 U. S. at5 528 ("We therefore conclude that § 1256 authorizes the grant of ''certiorari'' in the present case."〕 This paved the way for the US Government to seek review in the Supreme Court of judgments of the CCPA (and its successor the Federal Circuit) reversing denials of patent applications, which it did beginning with ''Manson''. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Brenner v. Manson」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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